Iran Based Jihadi Groups In Afghanistan

Introduction:

The Shiite comprised about 10 to 20 percent of the total Afghan population,[1] are mainly concentarated in central Afghanistan, particularly in Bamiyan province. Ethnically, they are composed of the Qizilbash, the Hazara and some groups of Farsiwans.[2] Of the three kinds of Shiites i.e the Hazara, the Qizilbash and the Farsiwan, the first one, with their major concentration in Hazarajat were the ‘under dogs’[3] of the Afghan society though they were the descendants of Genghis khan.Because of their brave, hardy and industrious out look, racial characteristics, physiogonomy and their antagonism towards the Pushtun dominance, they have occasionally been called as the ‘goorkhas’ of the west.[4] Qizilbash or kabili Qizilbash enjoyed an upper status in Afghan society. They became apolitical due to the fear of being pushed to the wall like the Hazara. The third group of Afghan Shiite living in Nimroz province along Iranian Border was more or less like it’s Iranian counter part across the border. The Shiite had also a visible presence in Heart, Kandahar, Logar and certain Northren provinces of Afghanistan.[5]

The Political Awakening Of Hazarajat And The Role Of Iran In The Pre Soviet Invasion Phase:

The Shiite in Afghanistan were politically backward and were unaware of their status and rights. The Shiites in Afghanistan were politically awaked by the educated Afghan clergy from Najaf and Iraq through Madrassa Movement. As a reaction to 1960’s Political reforms, Shiite launched a struggle for their rights . The Ulema also turned their religious centers into the centers of political training. They established Tekkieh Khanas in a period from 1960-1973 where shia got both religious and political training. One of the prominent Shia religious scholars, Mohammad Ismail Moballegh guided the Hazara towards shia nationalism. He is considered to be the father of modern Hazara nationalism.[6]

On the political front Iran in 1970s was striving to arrest the Soviet influence in Afghanistan. The Tarakai- Amin regimes also implicated Iran in the matter of supporting the insurgents.[7] The Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Shah also gave some assistance to the rebels fighting the Tarakai regime.[8] Some tribal- type Iranian assistance, especially to Shiite groups such as the Hazaras, began even before the Khomeini revolution in the early spring of 1979. After the Iranian Revolution aid became official policy.[9]

The Saur Revolution And The Role Of Iran In the Politics Of hazarajat:

The shias reacted sharply against the pushtun dominance who viewed saur revolution as the ‘ re birth of pushtun power’ and resisted it Tooth and nail.[10] In 1978 the Hazara fighters and Kabul regime fought a battle in the historic town of Bamiyan and Hazara fighters drove Kabul troops out of Bamiyan,[11] seizing the control of The Hazarajat provinces in local hands. Since 1981 onwards Hazarajat virtually became a state with in a state and established a self rule. The three sections of Hazara society i.e the leftist element, pro Iranian extremists and the traditional upper clergy were in a loose alliance called shura-e-Inqqilabi ittihad-e- islami Afghanistan since 1979, managed the local affairs of the Hazarajat state from 1981-83. Syed Ali Beheshti was the leader of the alliance.[12] The differences in the alliance appeared and the radiacal element with the support of pro-iranian organization Sazman-e-Nasar, in 1982 un succesfuly tried to oust the Ali Behshti. In 1984, the Pro- Iranian Nasar and another extremist pro-Iran Sipah-e- pasdaran entered into an alliance and established control on about two- thirds of Hazarajat.[13]

The ever increasing influence of Iran and its efforts to deal directly in the Hazarajat Shiite affairs led to the worst possible disruption and chaos in the area. The pro –Iran Sazman-e-Nasar, which was earlier receiving arms and funds from Iran, tried to keep itself independent of Iranian control.[14] Resultantly, the pro Khomeini extremist organization Sipah-e-Pasdaran and Nasar developed sharp differences and fought destructive and bloody battles for control of Hazarajat. The Sipahe-e-Pasdaran, however, gained an edge over Nasar in the war for power and control. This bitter scenario, however, led to the creation of many new small groups due to which the Shiite unity graph fell down noticibaly as compared to 1979-80[15] when the Shura was in ful control of Hazarajat.

Pakistan based Sunni afghan resistance groups had achieved unification to a certain extent in 1985, the Iran based Shiite resistance groups were far from unity during this period and were involved in bloody battles for the control of hazarajat. The main reasons for these fights were the absence of enemy to encounter in Hazara and the economic interests of fighting groups for arms and funds. The infighting between the Shiite groups reached appoint in 1985, the Iranian leader Ayatollah Montazari was compelled to arrange a ‘cease-fire’[16] agreement between the warring factions and groups. This agreement had the approval from most of theShiite hazara groups.[17]

Soviet Invasion And Resistance Of Afghan Groups:

The April 27, 1978 Saur Revolution in Afghanistan gave birth to a large number of fighting groups because of the repressive policy of the Tarakai and Amin regimes. Nothing could be said with certainty about the exact number of bands involved in the insurgency. Some random estimates, however, put this number between 150- 200 after a gradual shaping of the guerilla groups that took place from 1978-1983.[18]

These guerrilla fighters neither had any clear agenda nor they had any organization. “Most of the resistance groups were independent bands representing a cluster of villages , a valley, a section of a province, or a tribe”, noted a former American ambassador to Afghanistan while discussing the nature of the afghan resistance inside Afghanistan.[19]

In 1980, according to local estimates, over 50 different political groups claiming themselves as resistance components had established their offices in Peshawar alone.[20]

To cope with the burden of Afghan refugees administration, Islamabad recognised only seven parties of the Afghan Mujahideen to plan the entire resistance of the Afghans. The Peshawar based, seven parties were; the Hizbe-e- Islami Afghanistan of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the Hizb-e- Islami Afghanistan of Maulvi Younas khalis, the jamiat-e- Islami Afghanistan of Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, the Ittehad-e- Islami Afghanistan of abdul rabb Rassool Sayyaf, the Mahaze-Milie- Afghanistan of Pir Ahmad Gillani, the Jabhe- Nijate- Milli-e-Afghanistan of Professor Sibghatullah Mujaddidi and the Harkate-e-Inqilab-e-Islam-e Afghanistan of Maulvi Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi.

Unlike Sunni resistance groups and parties who were provided with proper military training, arms and sanctuary, the Shiite resistance groups could recive very little attention of the government of Pakistan. Pakistan started helping the Shiite groups shortly after the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and provided training facilities to the Hazarajat provinces of central Afghanistan. When Islamic Revolution came in Afghanistan , the Iranians had established their links with Hazaras.[21] Both Iran and Saudi Arabia were on the same side in the Afghan conflict but they supported opposing Afghan fractions of the Mujaheddin. Saudi support to Mujaheddin was in line with the U.S and Pakistan strategy of providing the bulk of funds and weapons to the most radical Sunni pushtun groups and ignoring the shia Afghans.[22] This ultimately pushed the Hazaras to the Iranian side.[23]

Due to the estranged relations between Iran and The USA, the Afghan Mujaheddin groups based in Iran recived no international military assistance. Nor did the two million Afghan refugees who fled to Iran recive the same humanitarian aid which their three million counterparts in Pakistan recived. Tehran’s own support to Mujaheddin was limited on account of budgetary constrains because of the Iraq-Iran war. Thus throughout the 1980’s, the USA effectively blocked off Iran from the outside world on Afghanistan. It was a legacy which only further embittered the Iranians against the USA and it would ensure much greater Iranian assertiveness in Afghanistan once the Cold war ended and the Americans had left the Afghan stage.[24]

Iran Based Shiite Resistance Groups:

Before 1978 Saur revolution, there were only eleven small and moderate size Shiite groups and parties in Afghanistan. Apparently they were not armed groups and there sphere of activities revolved around religious teachings and cultural activities. But shortly after the Revolution, their numbers rose to about 73,[25] later on these groups merged into big groups or alliances. Iran’s initial support to Mujaheddin only went to Hazara shias. It was the era in which Iran’s Revolutionary guards funded Shia militants world wide-from Lebanon to Pakistan. [26] Eight Afghan Shia groups were given official status in Tehran But Iran could never arm them sufficiently.[27] The Account of most important groups and alliances is given which played significant role in the Shiite Afghan Resistance movement from 1978 to 1990.[28]

(i) Sazman-e-Nasar

The organization originally came into being as “Groh-i-Mustazifeen”(Group of Oppresed) in 1973.[29] It started struggle in1978 against the Marxist regime. It comprised various anti government groups such as Roohaniyat Mubariz, Hizb-e-Hussaini, Danishjooyan-e-Ilm-e-Islami and Roohniyat Naveen. These groups were operating in Najaf, Iraq and Qom, Meshad, Iran.[30]

In March 1979, they merged into a single body with the name sazman Nasr Afghanistan. This organization had educated leadership and its caders mostly comprised Afghan students of local religious Madrassas. The organization was first led by Mir Hussain sadiequi and later by Abdul Karim Khaliili. The Sazman Nasar was a pro-Khomeini organization with its head quarters in the Iranian territory after the Saur Revolution. The Sazman Nasr had a powerful influence in the southwestren areas of Afghanistan.[31] It had about 1500 fighters and 4000 suppporters and controlled about 25 per cent population in Helmand and Bamiyan areas.[32]Its workers had taken part in many military operations against the Soviet and Afghan troops.[33]

The manifesto of Sazman Nasr called for the establishment of an interm government for the internal and external security of Afghanistan. It also supported a commission comprising the people having elaborated knowledge about islam and Afghanistan. It also highlighted the importance of Sazman Nasr with other liberation movements of the world.[34]

Its propaganda and publicity organs included Piyam-e-Mustazifeen, piyam-e-Khoon, Piyam-e- Nasr and a news bulletin Khabri Sazman-e-Nasr.[35]

(ii) Sazman Neroe Islami Afghanistan

This organization was founded in 1978 in Qom (Iran) by Hijjatul Islam Syed Muhammad zahir Muhaqiq, Hijjatul Islam Syed Mir Hussain Fasihi and Hijjatul Islam Syed Muhammad Hassan Sangcharki. These scholars had migrated from central Asia to Iran. This organization started its activity from Behsud, Wardak province and undertook many commando operations in Heart and adjoining areas.[36]

This organization had both Shia and Sunni commanders from Heart province likr arbab Sadiq, Maulvi ahsani Zarshik and Ghulam Mustafa Haqjoo(Shia) and Haji Hashim, Jumma Khan, Haji abdus salam, Sufi Abdullah and Kaftar Khan(sunni).[37]

At the initial stages of establishment Sazman Neroe lacked unity and it bifurcated shortly after the death of Aqa-i-Fasihi. The top ranking Commander of the Neroe, Syed Hussaini Muallim switched loyalties to Pasdaran-e-Jehad and the other commanders like Ahsani and Haqjoo joined the Nizhat-e-Islami. The son of Syed Asif Mohsini was also expelled from the party and then joined his father’s party. Similarly, Hasan karimi had also established a parallel organization under simply “Nero”.[38]

(iii) Harkat-e-Islami

Sheikh Asif Mohsini, a Kandahari pushtun Shia leader launched Harkat-e-Islami in 1979 in Qom, Iran. He was advised by the Ulema of qom.The Harkat-e- Islami was the amalgam of three small groups struggling individually inside Afghanistan. They were Rohaniyat Mubariz(center of activity, Qom), Sazman Azadi(center of activity, Kabul) and Groh-i- Quran wa Itrat (center of activity, Heart and inside Mehshad, Iran).[39]

It was the most powerful Shiite resistance party inside Afghanistan having its headquarters in Iran. It was the first ever Shia Afghan resistance party which launched full-scale struggle against the Soviet and Afghan forces. The area of military activity and political influence of Harkat was some portions of Hazarajat, south of Mazar-i-Sharif, west of Kabul, Paghaman, Dahan-e-shia-sang, Jaghori, Beshack, Faryab, Jozjan, Balkh and Badakhshan.[40]

Sheikh Asif Mohsini enjoyed good relationship with the Ayatollahs of Iran as he wasthe pupil of Ayatollah Khui of Iraq, But not with the Pasdaran of imam Khomeini.[41] Led by Ismail Javed in the late 1990, this organization had support of about 2000 fighters and another 15000 followers.[42]

(iv) Nizhat-e-Islami Afghanistan

It was an ideological body established by Ali Rahimi, Yusuf Zaki, Syed Safdar Ahsani, Mohammad ishaq Ishaqi and Abdullah Fakhar. From 1981-1984, this organization performed well on the military fronts in Heart and adjoining small cities and towns. But controversies and personality clashes badly affected the unity ofthis body. Shortly after its creation in 1982, some of its leaders like Rahimi and Anwari, along with their supporters, parted ways with Nizhat. Later, in 1985, the leader of a break-away faction, Rahimi went to Tehran and then Pakistan. This ld to bridging of differences and old activists rejoined the party.[43]

(v) Sazman Neroe Inqilab Islami

This was a spkinter of Sazman Naroe Islami Afghanistan. It came into being in 1980. This group recived arms and ammunition in large quantity from Jalaluddin Farsi of Iran. Arbab Saddiq was made its commander. But later on this group melted away because of vested interests of its leaders. Its commander, arbab Siddiq has also joined Hizb Allah. Sannan was the name of its publication.[44]

(vi) Hizb Allah

Qari Ahmad Ghor Darwazi had esdtablished this organizationin 1980.[45] It was a purely military organization with its centers of activity in Heart, Chaghcharan, Badghis, Kabul and other provinces of Afghanistan. Later on it was bifurcatd and its fighters joined other Shiite resistance groups. In 1992, after bloody fighting near Kabul between Hizbe wahdat-e-islami and Ittihad-e-Islami of Professor Abdur Rab Rassol Sayyaf, this organization merged into Hizbe wahdat. In 1990, Zamani led it.[46]

(vii) Pasdaran Jehad-e-Islami Afghanistan

It came into being by the name of Sipah in 1980. The first meeting to form this organization was convened in 1982. This meeting washeldin Behsud, Wardak province and the organization was named as Pasdaran Jehad-e-Islami Afghanistan.[47]

It was a pro-Iran organization and inspired by the Islamic Revolution of Iran. Its manifesto called for the unity of Shias throughout the world to counter the imperialist powers. It supported the solution of the Afghan problem with the help of allother nationalities of Afghanistan. This grouphad its influence in the northwestern areas of Hazarajat. Pasdar was its mouthpiece. Before becoming a component of Hizb-e-Wahdat, it was led by Mohammad Ali Ehsani.

Soviet withdrawl and After Math:

When Soviet leaders decided to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, they forced the reshuffled PDPA leadership to propose national reconciliation.[48] Debates over the political future of Afghanistan moved the Iranian government to organize the Shia groups they supported so that they, too, would be able to engage in political negotiations. On June 18, 1987, eight groups based in Iran- Nasar, Sipah, and six small Shia groups- announced the formation of an alliance. The Shura of Hazarajat joined later, but Harkat_i_Islami still distrusted by the Iranians, never did.[49]

Even though the Hazaras were a small minority and could not possibly hope to rule Afghanistan, Iran demanded first a 50-per-cent and then a 25-per-cent share for the Hazaras in any future Mujaheddin government.[50]The exit of Soviet troops and the end of Iran- Iraq war freed the Iranian government to pay more attention to Afghanistan. Although Tehran had opposed the presence of Soviet troops on it’s muslim neighbor’s soil, it became increasingly concerned about the rise of Pakistani and particularly Saudi influence in Afghanistan through the Sunni Islamists. In the summer of 1989 president Rafsanjani told the Shia groups that the jihad was over and that they should seek a political settlement with Kabul. Tehran similarly signaled its support for a political settlement to the Soviet government and the United nations.[51]

In 1990 Iran induced the Shi’a parties it had organized in an alliance to unit into a single party, the Hizb-i-Wahdat(Unity party). Unlike Pakistan, which still gave aid separately to seven parties and their commamders, Iran now funneled aid to this single center. It also gave some humanitarian and economic aid to Najibullah, whom it preferred to the Saudi-supported IIGA. Iran also took advantage of dissatisfaction with the Saudi-ISI-CIA-Hikmatyar axis to initiate a reapprochemnt with both its fellow Persian-speakers in Jamiat and the moderate nationalist Mujahidin groups. By 1991 Iran had signed a treaty on cultural cooperation with Tajikistan, Hizb-I wahdat, and Jamiat. Mujaddidi, Gilani, and Rabbani all traveled to Iran and opened offices there.[52]

Iran rearmed wahadat and by the time Kabul fell to the Mujaheddin in 1992, Wahadat controlled not only the Hazarajat but a significant part of Westren Kabul. As the Afghan war intnsifid between 1992 and 1995, so did the rivalry between Iran nd Saudi Arabia. The Saudis and Pakistais made frequent attempts to bring all the factions together. However, they also made every effort to keep Iran and the Hazaras out of any potential agreements. In the 1992 Peshawar Accord, and in 1993 Islamabad and Jalalabad Accords, Iran and Hazaras were sidelined.[53]

Tehran realized that unless it backed the non-Pashtuns, Pashtun sunnis would dominate Afghanistan. In 1993, for the first time, Iran began to give substantial military aid to the president Burhanuddin Rabbani in Kabul and the Uzbek warlord General Rashid Dostum and urged all the ethnic groups to join with Rabbani.[54]

After the disintegration of USSR ,Iran saw the prospects to end its international isolation by friendly ties with Central Asian states. United States tried to block the Iranian influence in the region. Iran resisted this temptation and also forged close ties with Russia. Between 1989 and 1993, Russia provided Iran with US $10 billion worth of weapons to rebuild its military arsenal. Iran and alliance. An alliance between Iran, Russia and the CARs in support of the non-Pashtun ethnic groups existed well before the Taliban emerged.[55]

The collapse of the Afghanistan state increased Iran’s own insecurity by creating a massive influx of drugs and weapons.[56] Saudi Arabia’s initial support for the Taliban convinced Iran that The USA was also backing them in an intensification of its 1980s policies to surround Iran with hostile forces and isolste it.[57] Of even greater concern to the Iranians was that, since 1996, the Taliban were also secretly backing Iranian groups who were anti-regime. In kandahar, the Taliban had given sanctuary to Ahl-e Sunnah Wal Jamaat, which recruited Iranian Sunni militants from Khorasan and Sistan provinces to overthrow the Shia regime in Tehran and impose a Taliban-style Sunni regime.[58]

Iran military aid to the anti-Taliban alliance escalated after the fall of Kabul in 1996 and again after the the fall of Mazar in 1998. However, Iran had no contiguous border with the alliance and was forced to either fly in or rail supplies to Masud’s forces, which involved getting permission from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. In 1998, Iranian Intelligence flew in plane-loads of arms to Ahmad Shah Masud’s base in Kuliab in Tajikistan and Masud became a frequent visitor to Tehran.[59]

The Taliban were incensed with Iran’s support for the alliance. In June 1997, the Taliban closed down the Iranian Embassy in Kabul, accusing Iran of destroying peace and stability in Afghanistan. However, it was the killing of the Iranian diplomats in Mazar in 1998 that nearly forced Iran into war with the Taliban.[60]

United Sates changed its perception about Taliban in 1998 and realized that Iran was a key player in the region.[61]

Conclusion

Soviet invasion was the era in which Iran revolutionary guards funded Shia militants World Wide. By 1982, Iranian money and influence had encouraged a younger generation of Iran- trained radical Hazaras, to over throw the traditional leaders. Iran recognized eight Afghan Shia groups but in fact could never arm and fund them sufficiently. Iran backed Hazars became marginal conflict inside and fought more amongst themselves than against the Soviets. Hazara factionalism was exacerbated by Iran’s short-sighted, Ideological policies in which the Hazars loyality to Tehran was viewed as more important than unity amongst themselves.[62] Iran’s security depends on the stability in Iran. The representation of Shia Afghans in the government Had been a Major concern in the past. The hardliners approach to the Afghan crises led to serious threats for the security and economy of Iran. To maintain peace in the region Iran must drain of its resources and look for peac prospects to solve Shi’a Issue in Afghanistan.

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[1] Azmat Hayat Khan, The Shias Of Afghanistan, Journal of Central Asia, no 32, Summer 1993. P. 33 Cited here after Azmat Hayat.

[2] Azmat Hayat, Op. Cit; P. 33

[3] Edward Girardet, Afghanistan; The Sovit war, New Delhi; Selectbook Srvice Syndicate, 1986. P. 56 cited here after Edward Girardet.

[4] H.W. Bellew., The Races Of Afghanistan, London; Thacker spink and co, 1980; reprinted ed., Lahore; Sh. Mubarak Ali Book Sellrs and Publishers,n.d. P. 116. Cited here after Bellew, Races.

[5] Muhammad Tauqir Alam, The Betrayal of Afghanistan; An Analysis Of The Afghan Resistanc Against Soviet Invasion, Islamabad; Pan Graphics (pvt) Ltd. p. 159. Cited here after Tauqir Alam.

[6] Azmat Hayat, Op. Cit; P. 42

[7] Central intelligence Agency, Biographic report of Mohammad Daoud, president of Afghanistan, secret BR-73-15, august 1973.

[8] Hafizullah Emade; exporting Iran’s Revolution ; The Radicalization of the Shiite Movement in Afghanistan , Middle eastern studies, vol. 31, no. 1, (London: January 1995: pp. 44 – 45.

[9]kurt Lohbeck, Holy War Unholy Victory; Eye Witness to the CiA’s Secret War In Afghanistan, CBS News, Washington; Regnery Gateway,1993. P. 101.

[10] Oliver Roy, Islam And Resistance in Afghanistan, Cmbridge; Cambridg University Press, 1986. p. 145. Cited here after Roy, Islam and resistance.

[11] Ibid, p. 141

[12] Tauqer Alam p. 161

[13] Roy , islam and resistance, p. 141.

[14] Ibid., p. 144.

[15] L. Mark Urban, War In Afghanistan, London; The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998. p. 170. Cited here after Urban, War

[16] Ibid, p.170

[17] Tauqer Alam, P. 163

[18] Bruce J. Amstuz, Afghanistan; The First Five Years Of Soviet Occupation,(Washington; 1986) , P. 89. Cited here after Amstuz.

[19] Ibid, P. 89

[20] Kamal Matinuddin, Power Struggle In Hindu Kush; Afghanistan 1978-1991, Lahore; wajidalis Ltd, 1991. P. 129. Cited Here after Matinuddin, Hindu Kush.

[21] Tauqeer Alam p. 161

[22] Ahmed Rashid Taliban p. 197

[23] Tauqeer Alam p. 161

[24] Ahmed Rashid, Taliban- Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism In Central Asia, United States; Yale university Prss, 2002. P.198. Cited here after Ahmed Rashid

[25] Baseer Ahmad Daulatabadi, Shanasnama Azhab Wa jaryanat-i-Siyasi Afghanistan, (Qom: 1992, n.p), p. 12 Cited here after Daulatabadi, Shanasnama.

[26] Ahmed Rashid , p. 198

[27] Ibid., p. 198

[28] Tauqir Alam p. 163

[29] Daulatabadi, Shanasnama, P. 289.

[30] Tauqir Alam p. 163

[31] Tauqir Alam P. 163-4

[32] Matinuddin, Hindukush, P. 77

[33] Tauqeer Alam P. 164

[34] Tauqeer Alam P. 164

[35] Ibid, P. 164

[36] Ibid, P. 164

[37] Ibid, P. 164

[38] Ibid P. 164-5

[39] Tauqir Alam P. 165

[40] Ibid, P. 165

[41] Azmat Hayat, Op. Cit; P. 53.

[42] Matinuddin, Hindukush, P. 77

[43] Tauqir Alam , P. 166

[44] Tauqir Alam P. 166

[45] Daulatabadi, Shanasnama, P. 188.

[46] Matinuddin, Hindukush, P. 78.

[47] Tauqir Alam P. 166-7

[48] Riaz M Khan, Untying the afghan Knot; Negotiating Soviet Withdrawl, Lahore; Progressive Publishers,1993. P. 190-201

[49] Barnett R. Rubin, Fragmentation of Afghanistan- State Formation and Collapse In Th International System, second ed, U.S; Yale University Press,2002. Reprinted ed, Pakistan; Oxford University Press. p. 249. Cited after Rubin.

[50] Ahmed Rashid, P. 199

[51] Washington post ,September 9, 1989, New york Times, November 19, 1989.

[52] Rubin, P. 252

[53] Ahmed Rashid, P. 199

[54] Ibid, p. 200

[55] Ibid, P. 200

[56] Ibid, P. 203

[57] Ibid, P. 203

[58] Ibid, P. 203

[59] Ibid, P. 203

[60] Ibid P. 203-4

[61] Ibid P. 205

[62] Ibid P.198

Written by: Dr. Kashmala Khalid Khan in April 2009.

The author of this publication is a Peshawar based freelance research analyst.

Note: This publication is an intellectual property of Author and can not be reproduced in any form. Any violation will be treated according to copy right laws.